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Unmasking the Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Soviet and American Campaigns 




Harrison Salisbury arrived in Moscow in the early days of March 1949 as the newly 
appointed bureau chief and correspondent for the New York Times. This was 
Salisburyȑs second trip to the Soviet Union. In last visit, during the dramatic winter 
of 1943, he remained in the USSR for fifteen months, covering the Soviet war effort 
for the United Press. Several months into his new assignment, Salisbury wrote to his 
bosses in New York that there had been a sea change in Soviet treatment of 
American journalists and that he felt extremely unwelcome in the Soviet capital: 
Serving as an American correspondent in Moscow in these times is very much 
like living under siege behind enemy lines. The idea is constantly hammered 
into the mind of the public that we are spies. Going to the theatre and the 
movies you get the impression that Russia is swarming with American 
correspondents, all of them equipped with camelȑs hair coats, snap-brim hats 
and leicas, peering through their dark glasses at Ȕmilitary secretsȕ. I don't 
believe there is a single anti-American play on the boards here - and there are 
more than 20 on the repertoire - which hasnȑt got an American journalist spy 
in the cast of characters. 1 
Borrowing images from American spy novels and film noir, Salisbury sought to 
recreate for his editors the atmosphere of tension and anxiety that accompanied 
his and his colleaguesȑ experiences in Moscow. He reported that given these 
portrayals in Soviet mass media, American journalists feared that they might 
become unwilling protagonists in a future Ȑspy storyȑ fabricated by the Soviet 
                                                 
1 Harrison Salisbury to Edwin L. James, 22 September 1949. Harrison Salisbury Papers, Box 187. Rare 
Book and Manuscript Library. Columbia University. 
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secret police. ȐCorrespondents here feel quite literally as though they were living 
in a powder-house which may explode at any moment,ȑ he concluded his letter.2   
Salisburyȑs two assignments in Russia gave him a good vantage point on the 
changes in Soviet attitudes toward American journalists after the Second World 
War. As two increasingly hostile camps replaced the wartime alliances, Soviet 
leaders came to view American journalists as spearheads of enemy propaganda 
and the weapons of U.S. imperialism. Soviet authorities erected institutional barriers 
to international reporting and subjected American correspondents in Moscow to 
censorship, surveillance, travel restrictions, and expulsions. Mass media and popular 
cultural products, such as theatre and film, were mobilised to discredit the 
reporting of American correspondents. Aggravated by such treatment, Salisbury 
and his colleagues wrote extensively about the difficulties of foreign 
correspondents in the Soviet Union. By the late 1940s, pundits and readers in the 
U.S. came to identify Soviet censorship and maltreatment of American journalists as 
one of the defining traits of an oppressive Communist dictatorship.  
It is less known that the correspondents for the Soviet news agency TASS 
(Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) in the United States also felt the 
repercussions of the deteriorating relationship between the two superpowers. 
Shortly after the war, American officials and pundits began to argue that TASS 
correspondents gathered intelligence rather than news and therefore endangered 
national security. American efforts to curb TASS developed on several parallel 
fronts and often involved grassroots initiatives that united journalists, government 
                                                 
2 Ibid.  
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agencies, businessmen, and anti-Communist zealots. The people who became 
involved in the anti-TASS campaign, however, did not consider their efforts as 
regulation of the foreign news media. The campaign attacked the premises of 
Soviet state-controlled reporting and questioned whether Soviet correspondents in 
the U.S. should be considered journalists. The resultant atmosphere of suspicion 
and hostility toward TASS had a long-lasting impact on the agencyȑs work in the 
United States. 
This article introduces a comparative framework to the study of Cold War 
journalism. Building on contemporary publications and archival sources from Russia 
and the United States, it examines the Soviet campaigns against American 
correspondents and American crusades against TASS. A comparative approach 
reveals that targeting of rivalsȑ journalists was not an idiosyncratic feature of the 
Soviet political system, but a practice that transcended the Cold War divide. Mutual 
hostility led both superpowers to abandon their wartime agreements for 
information exchange and journalistic collaboration. The Cold War imagination 
transformed these foreign correspondents from symbols of wartime alliance into 
dangerous subversives. A comparative approach demonstrates that Soviet and 
American campaigns against the enemyȑs correspondents were deeply embedded 
in their respective, socialist or liberal, approaches to journalism, news-making, and 
press-government relationship. These different ideological injunctions underlined 
the dynamics of each campaign, determined the mechanisms that were available to 
the participants, and informed each sideȑs responses to the attacks on its 
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journalists.3 Thus the main difference between the two campaigns, I contend, was 
not whether but how ideology informed the ideas and the actions on each side. As 
hostile references to enemyȑs correspondents multiplied in the Soviet Union and 
in the United States, propagandists and pundits on both sides positioned 
journalism as the symbol of their respective social and political systems. As a result, 
the rhetoric of rights, duties, and freedom of the press in the Soviet Union and in 
the U.S. became entangled in the ideological rivalry of the two superpowers.  
Soviet ‘Policy of Fortitude’ and American Foreign Correspondents  
On the 7th of November 1945, the 27th anniversary of the October Revolution, 
Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viacheslav Molotov, hosted a banquet for the 
diplomatic corps in Moscow. As the festivities progressed, Molotov began to make 
rounds in the great ballroom accompanied by Andrey Vyshinskii and a wine bearer. 
Each time Molotov came by his favourite foreign Ambassador of the moment, he 
stopped and proposed a public toast. In one such round, Molotov halted in front of 
Eddy Gilmore, the Moscow correspondent for the Associated Press, and suggested 
a toast with the American journalist. This unexpected attention made Gilmore feel 
as if he was Ȑknocked over with the Kremlin.ȑ4 After a brief exchange, through a 
loud and drunk translator, who slightly forgot his English during the celebration, 
                                                 
3 My definition of Ȑideologyȑ derives from what Terry Eagleton called the Ȑintersection between 
belief system and political power.ȑ The advantage of this Ȑbroad definition,ȑ according to 
Eagleton, is that it reflects the Ȑcommon usageȑ of the word ideology and could describe both the 
confirmation and the challenging of a particular social order. Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An 
Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 6-7. 
4 Eddy Gilmore to Alan J. Gould, Assistant General Manager of the Associated Press, 10 November 
1945. AP 2.1, The General Files: Foreign Bureau Files, The Archives of The Associated Press. 
(Hereafter APA). 
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Molotov made an unexpected move. The Minister asked Gilmore what he would 
say if the Soviet censorship of foreign correspondents in Moscow were to be 
abolished. Staggering and wondering if he had heard correctly, Gilmore answered 
that the removal of censorship would be a fine thing. Molotov then proposed a 
toast Ȑfor better understanding of one another,ȑ a toast that Gilmore insisted to 
drink in vodka, to show his respect for the Russian minister. When Molotov moved 
on to his next drinking fellow, U.S. Ambassador Harriman pulled Gilmore aside and 
said that he believed that the minister just indicated that censorship would be 
lifted“ The following days showed that Molotovȑs promise was sincere“ ȐNot a 
word has been taken out of any story of mine and theyȑve been passing political 
commentary without going through their always-up-to-now horrible process of 
referring us upstairs to Vyshinskii and Molotov,ȑ wrote Gilmore several days after 
the banquet.5  
The idyll was short-lived. One month later, in December 1945, foreign 
journalists became a source of a small scandal in the Soviet Politburo. While 
vacationing in Sochi, Stalin opened the most recent dossier on foreign press 
coverage of the Soviet Union and came upon two Ȑslanderous dispatchesȑ 
authored by the Moscow correspondents of the New York Times and the Daily 
Herald.6 The first item proposed that the members of the Politburo disagreed in 
their assessment of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers. The second item 
reported rumours that Stalin was planning to resign his post as the chairman of the 
Council of Peopleȑs Commissars“ Stalin blamed the Ȑslanderous dispatchesȑ on 
                                                 
5 Ibid.  
6 TASS prepared these compendia in its foreign bureaus on a weekly basis.  
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the loosened censorship of foreign correspondents.7 He charged that Molotovȑs 
eagerness to appease Great Britain and the U.S. sapped his ideological vigilance. 
The Ȑslanderous dispatchesȑ of foreign correspondents proved to Stalin that 
Molotov erred when he thought that relaxation of censorship would promote a 
better understanding between the USSR and its former allies. Molotovȑs Ȑliberal 
attitudeȑ undermined Soviet foreign policy and presented the bourgeois press 
with an opportunity to depict the USSR as weak and prone to concessions.8  Stalin 
urged his comrades to understand that uncompromising treatment of foreign 
correspondents must be part and parcel of the Soviet Ȑpolicy of fortitudeȑ vis-à-
vis the United States and Great Britain.9  
The new Ȑpolicy of fortitudeȑ toward foreign correspondents went into 
effect in February 1946. It manifested itself first and foremost in the tightening of 
Soviet censorship. The domestic censoring body - The General Directorate for the 
Protection of Secrets of the State (Glavlit) – took over the Foreign Ministryȑs 
responsibility of censoring foreign correspondents.10 Under Glavlit the censorship 
of foreign correspondents was exacerbated and revamped. The censors had the 
power to alter the journalistsȑ copy however they saw fit. The journalists received 
no indications as to why certain aspects of their reports, or sometimes the entire 
                                                 
7 O.V. Khlevniuk, et. al., ed. Politburo Tsk Vkp(B) I Soviet Ministrov Sssr, 1945-1953 (Moscow: 
ROSSPEN, 2002), 195. 
8 Ibid., 195-202. 
9 Ibid., 201-202. 
10 ȔResolution of Politburo TsK VKP(b) on censorship of outgoing information from the Soviet 
Union,ȕ 25“02“1946“ RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1056. Ll. 25-26. Accessed via the Internet Archive of 
Alexander Yakovlev Foundation: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/69274. Last 
accessed on 26.4.2012.  
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dispatches, were Ȑkilled.ȑ11 Another set of rules prohibited foreign 
correspondents from filing analyses or assessments, especially concerning Soviet 
politics, the economy, or foreign relations. The new rules thus reduced the 
journalistsȑ dispatches to contextualised quotes from TASS or the Soviet press. 
However, these too were sometimes censored without explanation and 
correspondents could not be confident that even a direct quote from Pravda would 
be cleared.12 It soon transpired that the new rules applied only to Ȕbourgeois 
correspondentsȕ – journalists writing for non-communist foreign media. The 
Ministry of Foreign Relations instructed Glavlit Ȕto passȕ the telegrams of 
correspondents for British, American, and French communist newspapers without 
intervention.13 
American correspondents soon learned that censorship was only one of the 
many obstacles to news-reporting from the Soviet Union. In November 1946 direct 
broadcasting from Moscow was banned, which led to the departure of CBS 
correspondent Richard Hottelet.14 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to deny 
                                                 
11 Telegram to Secretary of State, 5 March 1946; Box 126, 1946:891; Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, U.S. Embassy Moscow; Classified General Records, 1941-1963; Records of the Foreign 
Service of the Department of State, RG 84; National Archives, College Park MD. (Hereafter: NACP, 
U.S. Embassy in Moscow). 
The Politburo updated the rules in March 1946. The new additions permitted the correspondents to 
see the censorsȑ interventions. RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1057. L. 18. Accessed via Internet archive of 
Alexander Yakovlev Foundation: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/69274. Last 
accessed 26.4.2012. 
12 Whitman Bassow, The Moscow Correspondents: Reporting on Russia from the Revolution to 
Glasnost (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1988), 123; Craig Thompson to Time Magazine, 26 
November 1946; 1946:891, Box 126; NACP, U.S. Embassy in Moscow. 
13 GARF (State Archive of Russian Federation), f. R-9425, op. 1, d. 759, ll. 1; 3; 5; 7. 
14 The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrov), November 10, 1946, 
FRUS 1946, VI, 804.  
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journalistsȑ requests to visit sites or to travel outside of Moscow and thus, made it 
all but impossible to report from anywhere other than the Soviet capital.15 
American correspondents also found increasing difficulties in establishing contact 
with Soviet citizens and reporting about Ȑthe man on the street.ȑ U.S. embassy 
personnel and correspondents found that Russians eschewed any contact and 
regarded the foreigners with suspicion.16  
The new rules brought foreign journalists under the jurisdiction of institutions 
and practices that developed during the 1930s in response to Soviet anxieties 
about foreign threat. The Bolsheviks abolished censorship when they came to 
power, but they reintroduced it in 1922 as a temporary measure to prevent 
enemies of the revolution from using the press against the new socialist regime.17 
Glavlit began as a modest organisation that was charged with scanning the press 
for signs of anti-Soviet propaganda and state secrets.18 During the 1930s, as each 
wave of purges escalated the fear of foreign enemies and their domestic 
henchmen, Glavlit acquired new functions and expanded its staff. The Central 
                                                 
15 Foreigners were not allowed to travel by car further than 50 kilometres from Moscow, and even 
these trips were confined to ten specific roads. A trip outside of the city required an advance 
notification to the Soviet authorities“ ȔTreatment of U“S“ Personnel in the Soviet Union,ȕ 26 May 
1950; Box 8: 1620; American Representation in the USSR, 1933-1967; Bureau of European Affairs, 
Office of Soviet Union Affairs; Bilateral Political Relations Subject Files, 1921-1977, General Records 
of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
(Hereafter: NACP, Bilateral Political Relations). 
16 Eddy Gilmore quoted in a letter from Lloyd Stratton (Assistant to AP General Manager) to John 
Lloyd. 8 September 1947. AP 01.4B, Box 38, Folder 101, Records of Board President Robert McLean, 
APA. 
17
 Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917-1929 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 4-14. 
18 Zhirkov G.V., Istoriia tsenzury v Rossii XIX-XX vv (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2001), online edition, Part 
II: Evoliutsiia sovetskoii tsenzury: glvalit – kak ee ofitsialȑnoe ucherezhdenie (1922-1927). 
http://evartist.narod“ru”text9”38“htm#з_09  
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Committee urged Glavlit to emphasise vigilance, broadened the definition of a 
Ȑstate secret,ȑ and installed a censor in every newspaper.19 During the Second 
World War, Glavlit gained a powerful military arm and new functions. By 1945, it 
was a vast empire that employed thousands of censors throughout the Soviet 
Union. Glavlit decided what constituted a state secret and provided pre- and post-
publication censorship of all printed matter. It monitored every Soviet broadcast for 
domestic and foreign audiences and screened literature departing and arriving 
through the Soviet borders. Glavlit employees also supervised the excision of 
Ȑpolitically harmfulȑ literature from libraries and publishing houses.  
 The Cold War reintroduced anxieties about existential threat to the Soviet 
regime and these anxieties came to shape Soviet policies toward foreign journalists. 
The official approach to Ȑbourgeois correspondentsȑ was influenced by an 
ideological postulate that mass media could not exist independently of class 
interests. While the correspondents of communist newspapers were regarded as 
the friendly voice of international socialism and faced almost no restrictions in their 
reporting, Ȕbourgeois correspondentsȕ were perceived as the agents of hostile 
governments, inevitably linked to the ruling elites of their countries and seeking to 
undermine the Soviet Union like their capitalist masters. The restrictions on foreign 
journalists, especially censorship, attempted to minimise the damage that these 
Ȑenemy agentsȑ could cause and to regulate the production of the Soviet image 
overseas.  
                                                 
19 Zhirkov, Istoriia tsenzury, Part II. http:””evartist“narod“ru”text9”38“htm#з_09; Vladimir A. Nvezhin, 
ȔEsli zavtra v pokhod:ȕ podgotovka k voine i ideologicheskaia propaganda v 30kh – 40kh godax 
(Moscow: Eksmo, 2007), 55-57.  
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American Journalist – a Hero of the anti-American Campaign 
The new regulations on foreign correspondents failed to help the Soviet image 
abroad; in fact, the regulations made this image even worse. Throughout 1946, the 
dossiers of foreign press reports about the USSR grew thicker and their contents 
more acrimonious. American and British news media accused the Soviet Union of 
war mongering and of obstructing foreign correspondents in their efforts to report 
the truth about the USSR. In retaliation, the Soviet press launched a publicity 
campaign against Ȑbourgeois journalists,ȑ especially those from the United 
States. The campaign facilitated a broader shift in postwar rhetoric and explicitly 
identified the American press with the worst excesses of capitalist mass media.  
For example, the June 1947 issue of the popular satirical journal Krokodil 
featured a comic strip entitled, ȐIllustrations to the notes of a foreign 
correspondentȑs visit to Moscow“ȑ The comic chronicled a Ȑbourgeoisȑ 
correspondentȑs travel throughout the USSR and derided his falsifying comments 
about his Soviet experience.  While visiting a beach the journalist is seen scribbling 
in his notebook: ȐI had an opportunity to observe that the people surrounding me 
had no clothes to wear.ȑ20 In the following months and years anti-American 
cartoons and derision of the Ȑbourgeois pressȑ became more prominent and 
more sinister.21 Krokodil depicted the Ȑbourgeois pressȑ as ugly men, spiders, or 
snakes who were seen labouring to construct lies about the Soviet Union. From 
                                                 
20 Krokodil, 20 June 1947, p. 10. 
21 In 1945, Krokodil carried three cartoons targeting the American press (July 6, September 10 and 
December 30). In 1946, three cartoons attacked the press (20 August, 10 September, 30 September). 
In 1947 six cartoons were dedicated to the American press.  
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1947 these images were reinforced in Pravda articles dedicated to Ȑwarmongering 
bourgeois pressȑ and its Ȑservice to capitalist bosses.ȑ22  
Other cultural products, especially theatre and film shared this preoccupation 
with Ȑcapitalist pressȑ“ The most famous of these was Konstantin Simonovȑs 
play The Russian Question. The play was published in 1947 and received the 
prestigious Stalin Prize in Literature and the Arts. It centred around the American 
press, capitalist sponsorship of anti-Soviet propaganda, and a politically conscious 
journalist who seeks the truth. The protagonist of the play is an American journalist 
Harry Smith, whose capitalist bosses send him to the USSR, expecting a negative 
publication upon his return. Smith defies his bosses and sets out to write a book 
that will tell Americans that they have been misled about the Soviet Union, which is 
really a wonderful place. The media magnates are incensed; Smith loses his job, his 
girlfriend, and his house, but he sticks to his story. Stalin personally endorsed the 
play and instructed that it be widely publicised.23 In 1948, Mikhail Rommȑs film 
adaptation of The Russian Question also received the Stalin Prize, another 
demonstration of the importance of its political message. 
As they imagined American press, Soviet commentators emphasised both the 
persuasive power of individual journalists and the institutional patronage of those 
journalistsȑ work. This picture was shaped by the projection of Soviet ideology and 
practices onto American journalism. The Russian Question depicted the politically 
                                                 
22 The Ȑbourgeois pressȑ was the central topic of discussion in 3 articles that appeared in 1947, 10 
articles in 1948, 15 articles in 1949, and 29 in 1950. By contrast, the term was used only once in 1945 
and in 1946, and on both occasions in historical context. 
23 Konstantin Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia: razmyshleniia o I.V. Staline (Moscow: 
Kniga, 1990), 103-104; 147-148. 
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conscious individual American reporter whose search for truth was confronted by 
the machinery of false consciousness propelled by the bourgeois press. In this 
sense, Simonovȑs play illustrated a distinctly Soviet belief in the dialectics of 
individual and collective, subjective and objective forces in history. The Soviet vision 
was motivated by a belief in the large institutional support and material payoffs 
awarded to American journalists for Ȑpleasing their capitalist bosses and defaming 
the USSR.ȑ This Soviet tradition prided itself on ensuring the best possible material 
conditions for outstanding writers and correspondents.  
While the fictional Harry Smith illustrated the honest and friendly foreign 
reporter, real-life American correspondents in Moscow were made to personify the 
dangers that journalists from overseas posed to Soviet security. In April 1948, 
Soviet newspaper Izvestiia accused the American journalist Robert Magidoff of 
espionage.24 Magidoff, a Russian-born American, had worked in Moscow since 
1935 as a correspondent for NBC, the British Exchange Telegraph Agency, and 
McGraw-Hill. Izvestiia published a letter from Magidoffȑs secretary (an American-
born-now-Soviet citizen) accusing her boss of gathering intelligence for the U.S. 
and sending his reports via the diplomatic pouch.25 U.S. Embassy and Magidoff 
denied the accusations, but he was instructed nonetheless to leave the Soviet 
Union within 48 hours.26 Another espionage case involving an American journalist 
broke out in the early days of 1949. The Soviet authorities arrested Anna Louise 
                                                 
24 Bassow, Moscow Correspondents, 124-125; ȔPisȑmo v Redaktsiiu,ȕ Izvestiia, 15 April 1948; 
ȔExpelled Reporter Quits Russia,ȕ New York Times, 19 April 1948.  
25 Bassow, Moscow Correspondents, 124-125; ȔSoviet Ousts NBC Reporterȕ New York Times, 16 
April 1948. 
26 ȔExpelled Reporter Quits Russia,ȕ New York Times, 19 April 1948.  
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Strong, a member of the U.S. Communist Party and a staunch supporter of the 
Soviet regime. Strong, who spent several years in Moscow working for Soviet 
publications in foreign languages, was charged with espionage and deported.27 
Even communist correspondents from overseas, especially those who were friendly 
with Strong, began to feel not entirely welcome in Moscow.28  
 During 1948 and 1949, the campaign against American correspondents 
merged into two larger propaganda initiatives: the attack on Ȑrootless 
cosmopolitansȑ and the anti-American propaganda campaign. The first initiative 
focused substantially, but not exclusively, on Jews (euphemistically referred to as 
Ȑcosmopolitansȑ). It sought to uproot ȐWesternȑ and Jewish influences from 
Soviet culture. It denigrated the West and the U.S., boosting instead Russian 
greatness and achievements in literature, arts, and sciences.29 The second 
campaign, launched in 1949 by the Central Committeeȑs Agitation and 
Propaganda Department (Agitprop), structured and coordinated the hitherto 
dispersed anti-American propaganda under one official umbrella. Agitpropȑs 
blueprint for the campaign instructed Soviet publishers, newspapers, and 
broadcasters Ȑto publish systematically materials, articles, and pamphlets 
                                                 
27 Tracy B“ Strong and  elene Keyssar,  Right in her Soul :  the Life of Anna Louise Strong (New York: 
Random House, 1983), 280   
28 Salisbury reported to his editors that pro-Soviet Western correspondents became concerned after 
Strongȑs deportation“ For example, Ralph Parker, a British communist journalist, was very nervous 
about his future in the USSR and attempted to leave the country. Harrison Salisbury to C. L. 
Sulzberger, 23 May 1949, Salisbury Papers, Box 187. Later on, when the Daily Worker correspondent 
Joseph Clark arrived in Moscow, he complained that he faces many obstructions in his reporting and 
that the Soviet officials were distant and unfriendly. Fisunov to Ivan Beglov, Undated 1951. GARF, f. 
R-4459, op. 38, d. 309, l. 48. 
29 Peter Kenez, A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 182-183. 
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unmasking the aggressive plans of American imperialism and the inhuman 
character of the social and state order in the USA.ȑ30 The plan listed 29 topics that 
formed the thematic foundation of the campaign. Entry number 25, ȐVenal 
American Press,ȑ officially sanctioned the Soviet media to target American 
journalists.31 The campaign relied on the extensive Soviet apparatus of mass-media 
mobilization and proceeded swiftly and efficiently. Anti-American articles, books, 
films and plays spread like wildfire.  
New cultural products eliminated the nuanced representations of American 
journalists featured in earlier works, such as Simonovȑs The Russian Question. 
Plays, novels, and films now featured only two types of journalist-protagonists. The 
cast of characters in Nikolai Pogodinȑs play Missouri Waltz included ȐNick Clark – 
young, prostitutionalised cynic, a newsy.ȑ32 Clark was an example of the first 
Soviet prototype of American journalists: a nosy, alcoholic reporter for a small local 
paper, morally unscrupulous in his search for sensationalism and ready to switch 
political allegiances at his convenience. The second type was crystalised in a 1949 
Stalin-Prize-winning play-turned-blockbuster, Meeting at the Elbe, which featured 
Janet Sherwood – a femme fatale CIA agent, who used journalistic work as her 
cover while conspiring with ex-Nazis against the peopleȑs government in the 
Soviet-controlled German zone. Whereas in the 1947 play version Sherwoodȑs was 
merely a spy, the film added journalism to her list of credentials. Several scenes in 
the film depicted Sherwood masking her intelligence-gathering under the pretence 
                                                 
30 ȔThe Central Committeeȑs Agitation and Propaganda Departmentȑs (Agitprop) Plan of 
Activities for Increasing Anti-American Propaganda“ȕ RGASPI“ F“ 17“ Op“ 132“ D“ 224“ L“ 48“ 
31 Ibid., L. 52. 
32 Nikolai Pogodin, Pȑesy“ Missuriiskii valȑs (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatelȑ, 1952), 245“ 
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of reporting.33 Meeting at the Elbe and other popular cultural products reiterated 
the dangers surrounding the Soviet state, carrying within them a restated call for 
vigilance. At the same time, these representations identified Ȑbourgeois 
journalistsȑ with the mechanisms of American oppression at home and abroad 
and used journalists to showcase the essential faults of the capitalist system.  
Taking advantage of the newly available materials from Russian archives, 
several scholars have shown that in the early days of the Cold War Soviet leaders 
were preoccupied with fear of losing the international propaganda battle to the 
United States.34 Indeed, the campaign against foreign correspondents coincided 
with a thorough reshuffling of the Soviet information establishment, which focused 
on finding new paths for promoting the Soviet message abroad.35 The campaign 
against American journalists suggests that Soviet anxieties about the state of its 
international propaganda were closely linked to Soviet imagination of U.S. news 
media. That imagination in turn derived from a projection of Soviet ideology and 
practices on American journalists and mass media.  
The anti-American campaign and official treatment of foreign 
correspondents rejected the American liberal model of independent press as an 
instance of false consciousness. As we have seen, one of the themes in the anti-
American campaign was Ȑunmaskingȑ the alliance between the U.S. news media 
                                                 
33 Similarly, a film adaptation of Nikolai Virtaȑs 1949 play The Conspiracy of the Doomed presented 
a new character: Kira Rachel, a journalist from Chicago and an agent of imperialism. 
34 Vladimir Pechatnov, "Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, 
1945-1947." Cold War History 1 (January 2001): 1-27; Dzhahangir G. Nadzhafov,"The Beginging of 
the Cold War between East and West: The Aggravation of Ideological Confrontation." Cold War 
History 4, no. 2 (January 2004): 140-74. 
35 Pechatnov, "Exercise in Frustration“ȕ  
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and capitalist interests. The Ȑbourgeois journalistsȑ who dominated the campaign 
always acted on behalf of larger capitalist or imperialist structures and thereby 
reinforced the idea that mass media could not exist independently of class 
interests. Nick Clark puts his pen in the service of a local industrialist, who paves his 
way to political office with corruption and intimidation. Janet Sherwood blindly 
obeys the orders of her imperialist masters in the CIA.  
The close attention that Soviet propagandists paid to American journalists 
reflected the towering reputation of writers and the written word in Soviet culture. 
The pedagogical role of the press was central to the foundation of what Peter 
Kenez called the Soviet ȐPropaganda Stateȑ – a state that made indoctrination 
central to its formation and policies.36 Soviet culture did not put a sharp distinction 
between writers and journalists. Like Soviet writers, Soviet journalists were to 
provide the images and the information that would help their readers to overcome 
their Ȑsubjectiveȑ selves, infuse themselves with the Ȑobjectiveȑ forces of 
history, and join in the construction of socialist society.37 The Second World War 
only reinforced the Soviet faith in the power of the written word to change hearts 
and minds. Writers and war correspondents played a central role in mobilizing the 
population to unprecedented sacrifices for the war effort.38 Journalists, writers, and 
editors who took part in the production of Soviet news media during and after the 
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Second World War differed in their opinions, writing styles, and approaches to 
certain themes and topics. Nevertheless, they shared in the collectivist ethos of a 
mobilised press, which sought to carry the voice of the state and help the state in 
its project of educating the masses. In the Soviet eyes, American correspondents 
personified the mighty weapon of written words in the wrong hands. As writers, 
they had attained superior levels of political consciousness; nevertheless, they 
knowingly put themselves in the service of Ȑreactionȑ and in opposition to the 
historical progress. Herein lay the threat of American journalists and their 
prominent place in Soviet anxieties about losing the propaganda war: conscious 
and willing, they were some of the deadliest weapons of enemy ideology.  
 
As the campaign against American journalists escalated in the Soviet Union, 
most U.S. publishers withdrew their Moscow correspondents. Several editors 
decided that the amount and quality of material that they were getting did not 
justify the expenses of maintaining a foreign post. Others were forced to close their 
bureaus because the Soviet authorities refused new visas for returning and new 
correspondents.39 Between 1945 and 1949, the number of American 
correspondents in Moscow went from nineteen to five. The remaining five 
journalists comprised the entire American press corps in the Soviet Union until 
1953.  
American publishers and government officials interpreted Soviet limitations on 
foreign correspondents as calculated attempts to manipulate international public 
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opinion and to help Communist propaganda infiltrate the United States.40 Current 
and former Moscow correspondents supported this interpretation.41 When State 
Department officials learned that it was impossible to resolve the censorship issue 
through diplomatic channels, they suggested that the publishers attach an 
indication Ȑpassed through censorȑ to every news item with a Moscow byline.42 
However, the Associated Press and the New York Times – both major players in the 
Moscow press corps – resisted these proposals. The AP Board President Robert 
McLean and Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the Times agreed that if they were to follow 
the State Departmentȑs suggestions, they would have to attach the censorship 
caveat to roughly half of the dispatches from their overseas bureaus.43 United 
States government did not try to reciprocate by censoring the dispatches of Soviet 
correspondents, first and foremost because it lacked the appropriate institutions to 
do so. The First Amendment, which protected the press from government 
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intervention, precluded the establishment of any organisation that would resemble 
the Soviet Glavlit.44  
 The campaign against Soviet journalists in the United States developed on 
several parallel fronts; it often involved grassroots initiatives, and brought together 
government agencies, elected officials, journalists, businessmen and anti-
Communists. These actors often differed in their agendas, their understanding of 
the threats that Soviet news agencies posed to American security, and their visions 
of the ideal American response to Soviet information policies. Nevertheless, the 
participants in the campaign united around the premise that TASS was not a proper 
news service, but an agent of enemy propaganda. Like their Soviet counterparts, 
American commentators saw the press as one of the central symbols representing 
the differences between Soviet communism and American liberal capitalism. The 
rhetoric surrounding the attacks on TASS identified it with state monopoly on 
information, repression of free speech, manipulation of public opinion, and 
subversion and espionage. The struggle against TASS became therefore an 
assertion of American liberal values vis-à-vis the Communist enemy. 
First Attention to TASS: Spies or Newsmen? 
In September 1945 Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy in 
Ottawa, defected to the Canadian authorities. Gouzenko revealed that the Soviet 
Union ran an extensive spy ring, which involved the Soviet Embassy and the 
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Communist Party of Canada and that Soviet spies penetrated the innermost depths 
of the Canadian establishment and its civil service. In July 1946, a Royal 
Commission of Inquiry, which was appointed to investigate Gouzenkoȑs 
allegations, found, among other things, that the head of TASS in Ottawa played a 
central role in the spy ring.45 The Gouzenko affair dominated the headlines across 
North America and U.S. press closely followed the revelations. The Canadian spy 
scandal fed the escalating fear of Communist infiltration and attracted attention to 
Soviet representatives in the United States.46 The most visible of these 
representatives, who also enjoyed a great degree of access to information and 
government institutions were the employees of the news service TASS. 
TASS operations in the United States were split between New York City and 
Washington DC and were closely coordinated with the Soviet Embassy and Soviet 
mission in the United Nations. The New York bureau was the centre of TASS activity 
and consisted of twenty people, most of whom were local American employees. It 
conducted general reporting, covered the U.N., and prepared Ȑspecial information 
bulletinsȑ – compendia of American publications on particular subjects, such as 
agriculture, the U.S. budget, or nuclear energy. The compendia included 
information that was in public domain – newspapers, magazines, trade press, and 
open reports published by the U.S. government. The Ȑbulletinsȑ were distributed 
among the members of Politburo and senior officials in the relevant ministries. 
Another special compendium, which collected every publication, broadcast, or 
speech related to the Soviet Union, went to senior Politburo members on a weekly 
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basis. The Washington bureau covered Congress, the State Department, and the 
White House. Three out of four Washington bureau employees were U.S. citizens. In 
addition to its reporting and information gathering duties, TASS functioned as the 
official voice of the Soviet Union. An announcement from TASS carried the same 
authority as an official statement emanating from the state itself.  
TASSȑs links to the Soviet government prompted U.S. officials to scrutinise 
the agencyȑs activities more closely. In 1946 President Truman revoked a wartime 
directive, which exempted news media of the Allied countries from registering as 
agents of foreign governments under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). 
The act was introduced in 1938 and required individuals and organisations Ȑacting 
as agents of foreign principals in a political or quasi-political capacityȑ to disclose 
the nature of their relationship with foreign governments and to account for their 
activities on behalf of foreign powers.47 While the lawmakersȑ original concern 
was Nazi propaganda, the postwar anxiety about Communist subversion led to a 
renewed use of the act.48 TASS officially registered as an agent of a foreign 
government with the Justice Department in 1947.49 FARA provisions required that 
the agency keep copies of all its announcements, accounts, and letter exchanges 
with Moscow and organisations and individuals in the United States. The Justice 
Department had the right to examine these records at any time, and the FBI 
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conducted routine inspections of TASS offices.50 The agencyȑs American and 
Soviet employees had to report their salaries, other incomes, and addresses to the 
Justice Department. Soviet correspondents in Washington, DC, were forbidden to 
reside outside of a forty miles radius from the site, in this case the White House, of 
their professional activities. The correspondents in New York enjoyed a slightly 
wider radius because of their work for the UN. To travel anywhere beyond their 
permitted residence boundaries, Soviet correspondents were required to submit 
their proposed itinerary in advance to the Justice Department and await its 
approval.51  
FARA provisions reflected the liberal media ideology that emphasised the 
importance of separating the government and the press. News services were not 
exempt from registration and U.S. government scrutiny if their activities were 
Ȑperformed for or directed by any foreign government or foreign political party,ȑ 
or if they were Ȑowned or subsidised byȑ political entities from overseas.52  FARA 
established that news services were entitled to protection from government 
intervention, and they would be given the rights and privileges of the press only if 
they met the American liberal definition of news media. TASS registration under 
FARA was consistent with these principles. In 1951, an internal State Department 
memo on Foreign Correspondents explained that FARA regulations applied first 
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and foremost to Ȑall correspondents from Communist countries.ȑ53 U.S. officials 
did not consider the restrictions on TASS as attempts to regulate foreign news 
media because they believed that TASS was an agent of international Communism 
rather than a proper news service. Thus, government officials on both sides 
considered the adversaryȑs correspondents as the weapons of hostile propaganda 
and dismissed the rivalsȑ practices of news making as illegitimate.  
Despite FARA regulations, TASSȑs ties with the Soviet government continued 
to generate antagonism toward the agency. Several pundits remained unconvinced 
that FARA provided an adequate degree of control over TASSȑs activities in the 
United States. For example, in May 1948, an editorial in the New York Times 
suggested that TASS was a convenient cover up for Russian spies in the U.S. and 
therefore should be monitored more closely:  
Perhaps […] there could be a check-up on the number of words Tass [sic] sends 
to Moscow and the number of words printed in the newspapers. What are the 
other words for? And who signs the long telegrams sent from Moscow every day 
to the Western Hemisphere? That is, that could be done if we wished a tight 
check.54 
In the absence of tighter government regulations, individual officials began to take 
matters into their own hands. In 1948, Aleksander Aleksandrov, TASS bureau chief 
in New York, 
reported to the agencyȑs directors in Moscow that several government ministries 
refused to supply TASS with standard reports that previously had been in the public 
domain and available to the press. In each case, Aleksandrov appealed to the press 
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secretary of the ministry in question but usually to no avail. After querying 
colleagues from other foreign news services, Aleksandrov learned that TASS was 
the only agency that could no longer receive the reports.55 Another, and more 
significant, case of official discrimination occurred in 1950 when TASS was the only 
foreign news service barred from the Pentagonȑs press briefings on the Korean 
War. Even though on that occasion the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an 
official statement of objection, the Department of Defence ignored it and 
continued to bar TASS from its press conferences.56 
 
Although TASS offices in the U.S. seldom made headlines, the agencyȑs 
employees felt that the American press missed Ȑno opportunity to pin-prick us in 
its reports.ȑ57 Media coverage usually questioned the nature of the agencyȑs ties 
to the Soviet government and explored the isolation and the demeanour of TASS 
correspondents.58 Occasionally, pundits suggested that the U.S. should retaliate 
against the Soviet treatment of American correspondents and impose an equally 
strict set of limitations on TASS.59 In January 1951, The Saturday Evening Post ran 
the longest, most acerbic feature about TASS to date. Titled ȐStalinȑs American 
Snoops,ȑ the article reiterated the assertion that TASS was Ȑin no sense an honest 
news agencyȑ but a combined Soviet propaganda service and intelligence 
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operation.60 The author, Paul Healey, was particularly interested in TASSȑs 
American employees and explored how the pathology of dissent led these sons 
and daughters of good American families to betray their country and work for the 
Soviets. In conclusion, Healey argued that the U.S. government should demand 
from Soviet leaders Ȑa quid pro quoȑ in access to information and press coverage 
and that Ȑmany Washington officialsȑ feel the same way.61 The basic premise of 
the article – that TASS was not a real news agency – repeated ideas that had been 
floating in the American press since 1946. However, the feature introduced several 
new aspects to anti-TASS rhetoric. First, the article cited U.S. Congressmen and 
senior officials and thus conveyed the impression that the establishment shared 
 ealeyȑs view that TASS was engaged in suspicious activities. Second, the piece 
explicitly labeled TASSȑs American employees as traitors and Soviet henchmen, an 
accusation that could have had serious social and legal repercussions in the context 
of the Red Scare.  
Ivan Beglov, the new bureau chief in New York, was convinced that the article 
in the Saturday Evening Post inspired several American firms to take independent 
action against TASS. Beglov sent a distressed letter to Moscow and reported that 
after the article appeared, several private companies refused to honour their 
contracts with TASS and declined the agencyȑs requests to subscribe to their 
publications.62 Each company articulated its refusal of services in explicit political 
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terms. For example, Georgia Webbing & Tape Company, from Columbus, GA, 
responded to Beglovȑs request with the following letter: 
It came as a surprise to us that the Soviet Union is still able to make purchases 
in this country. We do not often have an opportunity to take direct action in 
International affairs. In our own small way we feel that one of the greatest 
contributions we can make at this time is a firm refusal to sell or even quote to a 
country, which has been responsible for so much bloodshed. We can only hope 
that our action could be endorsed by all business concerns the world over.63  
The letter demonstrates how individual actors internalised the popular 
rhetoric, which equated TASS with the Soviet government. Unlike media pundits or 
government officials, the representatives of Georgia Webbing & Tape Company 
were not preoccupied with the questions of TASSȑs legitimacy as a news service. 
Similarly, other businessmen that decided to terminate their contracts with TASS 
believed they were imposing economic sanctions on the Soviet Union. Vendors and 
publishers sacrificed business interests for the opportunity to curb a Soviet agent 
and situated their actions in a larger context of Americaȑs fight against 
Communism.  
‘TASS is not a bona fide New Agency, but a Soviet Propaganda Bureau’ 
In April 1951 William B. Oatis, Associated Press bureau chief in Prague, was 
arrested on charges of espionage and later confessed under duress. Ignoring U.S. 
objections, Czechoslovakia held a show trial of Oatis and two local employees of 
the AP. In July 1951, Oatis was convicted of espionage and sentenced to ten years 
in prison. For many Americans, Oatis case became the ultimate symbol of the 
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differences between the liberal and communist presses. Editorials explained that 
Oatis was imprisoned for doing his job as an honest reporter in the American 
tradition. Popular interpretations of the case contrasted the Ȑtruthfulȑ and 
Ȑfreeȑ press in America with the Ȑdeceptiveȑ and Ȑheavily controlledȑ press in 
the Soviet Union.64  
The Associated Press, The American Society for Newspaper Editors (ASNE), 
and other leading journalistic organisations in the U.S. pressured the White House 
and the State Department to strike Czechoslovakia with harsh measures. The 
proposals of the media lobby found support in both houses of the Congress.65 
 owever, the administration refused to heed the mediaȑs demand to cut 
diplomatic ties with Czechoslovakia or to impose a trade embargo. When it became 
apparent that extreme measures against Czechoslovakia would not be 
implemented, the media lobby turned against TASS. The agency was singled out 
because at the time it was the largest and the most visible Communist bloc news 
service operating in the U.S. and the only one to have a Washington bureau and 
accreditation with the State Department. 66 The indignation at Oatisȑs 
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imprisonment mixed with long-term frustrations with Soviet treatment of American 
correspondents and with the general atmosphere of anxiety about Communist 
subversion. These sentiments reinforced one another and set the campaign against 
TASS in motion. Although the Oatis case figured prominently in the attacks on 
TASS, equally ubiquitous were references to the dire lot of all American 
correspondents behind the Iron Curtain and discussions of the dangers that Red 
journalists posed to American security. 
Shortly after the Oatis verdict was delivered, Alexander F. Jones, the President 
of the American Society for Newspaper Editors (ASNE), publicly demanded a 
government investigation of Mikhail Fedorov, TASS bureau chief in Washington, 
DC.67 American press had paid attention to Fedorov ever since he arrived in 
Washington to replace the American Laurence Todd as the head of TASS bureau. It 
was well known among the capitalȑs journalists (and frequently reported in the 
press) that during the war and prior to becoming a correspondent for TASS, 
Fedorov served as an aeronautic engineer in the Soviet military.68  Alluding to this 
aspect of Fedorovȑs biography, Jones charged that Fedorov was not a newsman 
but a Politburo trainee and, as such, should not be allowed access to 
governmentȑs press briefings“69 
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While the government did not act on Jonesȑs proposal, the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee did. Representative Christian A. Herter sent a letter to the New 
York bureau chief, Ivan Beglov, and posed a series of Ȑfrank questionsȑ that 
aimed to learn the Ȑfactual truthȑ about Ȑthe status of TASS as a world news 
gathering agency.ȑ70 Herter probed TASSȑs ties to the Soviet government and to 
the Soviet Embassy; investigated the nature of the agencyȑs relationship with the 
Communist Party USA, the Communist press; and asked whether the Daily Worker 
was a branch of TASS. 71 Eager to forestall another attack on TASS, Beglov 
dispatched a cordial letter, which replied to Herter in Ȑthe spirit of the 
questionnaires that TASS submitted to the Department of Justice.ȑ72   
In September 1951, ASNE President began another attack on TASS. Jones 
charged that TASS and Fedorov daily applied themselves to the task of destroying 
the U.S. and Ȑinstalling a Communist world domination.ȑ 73 He demanded that 
TASS correspondents be barred from the Congressional news galleries. Shortly 
after, the ASNE chapter in Washington, DC, presented a similar request to the 
Standing Committee of Congressional Correspondents – an elected body of five 
journalists that supervised Congressional press galleries and regulated the 
admission. The Standing Committee decided that no new correspondents from the 
Soviet Union would be admitted to the galleries until it was possible to establish 
whether TASS was an agent of Soviet propaganda and intelligence. Letters 
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requesting the relevant information were submitted to the State and Justice 
Departments“ While the Standing Committee was awaiting the governmentȑs 
assessment, ASNE pulled the entire weight of its influence and publicity against 
TASS, focusing particularly on the Washington bureau. 
Editor and Publisher, an influential trade magazine closely associated with 
ASNE, seconded the motion on its editorial pages. The magazine printed the full 
text of Jonesȑs statement and supported his assertion that the ban on TASS would 
be appropriate retaliation for the imprisonment of Oatis and for the maltreatment 
of American correspondents in Communist countries.74 Moreover, Editor and 
Publisher situated the campaign against TASS within the broader premises of 
American liberal media ideology and used false information to justify the ban on 
TASS. Stating incorrectly that TASS correspondents in the U.S. hold diplomatic 
passports and that their registration as foreign agents with the Justice Department 
is Ȑvoluntary,ȑ the editors argued that TASS was not a news agency.75 Since TASS 
was not a news service, continued the editors, the ban on the agency would not 
violate the First Amendment.76  
 In the following days and weeks, the arguments made by Jones and Editor 
and Publisher were reiterated in the American press and in the statements of 
several public figures. Senator Robert OȑConor (D, MD) addressed his fellow 
representatives on the questions of Oatis and TASS“ OȑConor argued that the 
Congress should expel TASS from its galleries and demanded that the agencyȑs 
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credentials be withdrawn. All journalists from Communist countries, continued 
OȑConor, should be Ȑsubjected to the same restrictions placed upon American 
correspondents on the other side of the Iron Curtain.ȑ77 A similar motion was 
introduced by OȑConnorȑs colleague from the other side of the aisle, the 
Republican Senator Burdick (R, ND).78 Several days later, Representative Emanuel 
Celler (D, NY) said that he would ask the House to bar TASS representatives from its 
galleries as well.79 
 ASNE continued the campaign in Editor and Publisher. In a poll that the 
magazine conducted among American editors, 28 out of 40 respondents approved 
tough action on TASS.80 Those in favour of the measures reiterated the basic 
premises of Editor and Publisherȑs original call for action: they mentioned Soviet 
maltreatment of Oatis and other American journalists, stressed that TASS 
correspondents were dangerous agents of Communist espionage, and argued that 
TASS was not entitled to the rights and freedoms of the press because it was Ȑnot 
a bona fide news agency.ȑ For example, Palmer Hoyt, the influential editor of the 
Denver Post wrote that the time was ripe for action against TASS because Ȑit is a 
straight propaganda agency, dealing in distortion, smearing and deliberate 
falsification“ […] It is too much to ask that we let Oatis rot in jail on charges of 
espionage and permit communist espionage the freedom of our official sources of 
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information.ȑ81 The more concise and less thoughtful William Randolph Hearst, Jr. 
wrote: Ȑthey are not deserving of the name Ȑnewspapermanȑ or Ȑpress 
representativeȑ and I say throw them out“ It gives me such pleasure to say this 
that I'm even paying for the wire.ȑ82  
 The campaign to bar TASS from the Congressional galleries did not proceed 
without opposition. Several respondents in Editor and Publisherȑs poll objected to 
the measure on the grounds that it stood little chance of helping Oatis and could 
make things worse for American correspondents in Communist countries. Other 
dissenting voices stressed that the ban on TASS could endanger the freedom of the 
press in the United States. The editorial columns of the Washington Post and of the 
New York Times epitomised these respective approaches. The Post proposed that 
instead of barring TASS from the galleries, the State Department should declare 
Fedorov as persona non grata and thus Ȑend the direct reports to Moscow by the 
diplomatic pouch.ȑ83 The Times, on the other hand, warned that the move against 
TASS would be detrimental to American freedoms and urged everyone to 
understand that ȐOur cause cannot be served by police-state restrictions.ȑ84 
However, even those who warned that the ban on TASS could endanger the 
freedom of the press shared the view that TASS was not a real news agency. 
Expressions of concern about the ban were articulated mostly in terms of potential 
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impact that the ban could have on American news media and did not suggest that 
TASS was entitled to enjoy the same freedoms.85 
 All eyes were on the State and Justice Departments and their verdict as to 
whether TASS should be considered a bona fide news agency. Both ministries 
conducted themselves with extreme caution and did not rush to weigh in on the 
matter. The Attorney General explained that, for reasons of confidentiality, the 
Justice Department could not reveal any information it had on TASS beyond the 
fact that it was registered as an agent of foreign government. Assistant State 
Secretary Jack K. McFall said that representatives of the press should be the ones to 
determine TASSȑs access to the Congressional galleries. Behind the scenes, State 
Department officials shared the popular conviction that ȐTASS as a whole was not 
a news agencyȑ and said as much to the agencyȑs American employees.86 
However, the same officials thought that banning TASS would jeopardise American 
correspondents and other U.S. interests across the Iron Curtain and will fail to help 
Oatis.87   
On September 21, 1951, the Standing Committee of Congressional 
Correspondents announced that it had decided against barring Fedorov or other 
TASS journalists from Congressional galleries. The resolution stated that Ȑthe 
principles of a free press cannot be upheld by abridging themȑ and explained that 
the Committee did not wish to exceed its mandate and Ȑmove into the field of 
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international diplomacy.ȑ88 The President of the Associated Press Managing 
Editors Association said that the Standing Committee had Ȑfumbledȑ and proved 
Ȑinefficient in handling the dispute on TASS.ȑ89 By contrast, an editorial column in 
the Washington Post praised the decision as serving Ȑthe best interests of the 
American press,ȑ adding that ȐAmerican institutions cannot be preserved by 
distorting them in the Soviet image.ȑ90 
It is not a coincidence that ASNE, the AP, and Editor and Publisher led the 
attacks. American publishers opposed government regulation of the press as 
strongly as they opposed communism, for both targeted the core of their interests: 
free flow of information and free markets.91 American news media embraced and 
took a great pride in the notion that it was their duty to educate the public about 
the world around them, to provide information that was essential for informed 
participation in government, and to protect the citizens and their freedoms from 
the powers that be.92 Nothing could pose a starker contradiction to these vaunted 
principles than TASS, a news agency that functioned as the official voice of the 
Soviet government and remained closely linked to its policies.  
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 Just as the campaign against TASS emphasised the American commitment to 
liberal ideals of separation between the press and the government, these ideals 
were changing and adapting to new realities of the national security state. After 
1945 most American publishers aligned themselves with the governmentȑs anti-
Communist agenda and supported Americaȑs standoff with the Soviet Union“93 
However, the Cold War introduced new tensions into this relationship as 
government officials began to stress the importance of secrecy in protection of 
national security and erected new barriers to the news mediaȑs access to 
information.94 The publishers vehemently resisted these policies, which they 
criticised as detrimental to American democracy and freedom of speech.95 The 
attacks on TASS provided publishers, journalists, and government officials with a 
platform where they could reiterate their commitment to the rights of the press 
while glossing over the contested and the changing meaning of these rights. In this 
increasingly complicated relationship between the government and the press, the 
consensus that Soviet state control undermined TASSȑs credibility as a news 
agency gained a symbolic significance.  
 
The campaign against TASS took a heavy toll on its correspondents. New York 
bureau chief Ivan Beglov reported to his bosses in Moscow that American 
employees found it particularly difficult to cope: ȐThe systematic hunt of TASS in 
bourgeoisie press and open invasion of our New York and Washington offices by 
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the FBI led many of them to depression and even – in unique cases – panic.’96 For 
example, Jean Montgomery, a Washington bureau correspondent, told Beglov that 
since the campaign against TASS had begun, hooligans had smashed the windows 
of her apartment twice. Montgomery agreed to continue working for TASS only on 
the condition that she would be transferred to New York.97 Another Washington 
correspondent, Laurence Todd, notified Beglov that Ȑhis health demands a 
lengthy, and maybe even permanent break from his work for TASS.ȑ98 Beglov 
reported that the campaign against the agency reached former employees as well. 
For example, Travis Hedrick, who no longer worked for the agency, was called to 
testify before the McCarran Committee (U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Internal 
Security). Beglov worried that other Americans on his staff would also be 
summoned.99  
 Soviet leaders and TASS bosses in Moscow closely followed the campaign, 
but despite Beglovȑs pleas, they decided to take no action. TASS director Nikolai 
Palȑgunov explained to Beglov that the campaign against the agency was the 
logical outcome of American capitalistsȑ fear of Soviet journalists and urged his 
people to preserve the ideological rigour of their reporting:  
Explain to the comrades that we could expect similar, and perhaps, even more 
venomous and vicious attacks of American reactionary circles on TASS workers. 
Impress upon the Soviet comrades that we must retain complete self-control, 
must keep working as if nothing is happening, not to be afraid, and continue to 
attend press conferences, the Congress, and other places where they usually go. 
                                                 
96 Beglov to Palȑgunov, 9 November 1951. GARF, f. R-4459, op. 38, d. 309, l. 90. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Beglov to Palȑgunov, 12 September 1951. GARF, f. R-4459, op. 38, d. 309, l. 76.  
 37 
At the same time, particularly impress upon them that they must not allow 
others to provoke them for irresponsible words and actions and must not 
provide [the American press with reasons for] provocative opinions.100  
Palȑgunov made sense of the attacks on TASS through the prism of Soviet 
ideology. He was convinced that American Ȑreactionariesȑ attacked TASS because 
they were ordered to do so by the capitalist magnates, who controlled the press. 
Palȑgunov urged his people to carry on the duties of socialist journalists, a main 
part of which was the unmasking of the capitalist world order. Unlike many 
American publishers, who withdrew their journalists from Moscow in response to 
censorship and other limitations, Soviet leaders expanded their network of 
international correspondents and persisted in their efforts to indict the United 
States“ Palȑgunov urged Beglov to transfer the most crucial aspects of the 
agencyȑs activity to the ȐSoviet comradesȑ and promised to dispatch additional 
journalists from the Soviet Union in the near future.101  
The echoes of the campaign persisted until the end of 1951, and occasional 
articles about TASSȑs links to espionage and suspicious activity continued to 
appear in the American press after the campaign subsided. In November 1951 the 
New York Times ran a lengthy profile article on the agencyȑs operations in the U.S. 
and revisited the question of TASSȑs threat to national security.102 The Times 
contended that while many questions about TASSȑs activity remained open, 
shutting the agency down would not reduce the scope of Soviet espionage in the 
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United States.103 According to the Times, all the information that TASS sent to 
Moscow was already available in American newspapers, and making this 
information accessible to the public was a calculated risk that the U.S. ran as a free 
country.104 At least on the surface, the profile in the New York Times drew the line 
under question of TASS. Pundits and government officials agreed that the agency 
served as a direct wire to the Kremlin, but they continued to accept TASSȑs 
presence in the US as a tolerable evil.  
Conclusion: 
 Comparative analysis of Soviet and American campaigns against the rivalȑs 
foreign correspondents sheds light on the dynamics of what David Engerman called 
the Ȑbattle of ideasȑ at the heart of the Cold War.105 Mass media played a central 
role in Soviet and American societies and in each sideȑs understanding of its 
political and cultural mission in the world. The campaigns against the rivalȑs 
journalists were steeped in the respective, socialist and liberal, understandings of 
the role of the press and its rights and duties vis-à-vis the government and fellow 
citizens. The different ideological injunctions shaped the dynamics of each 
campaign, determined the institutional mechanisms that they relied on, and 
influenced the responses of journalists, editors, and political figures on both sides.  
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 Close collaboration between the state and mass media was central to the 
Soviet mission of enlightenment and creation of the New Man. Journalists and 
writers were to play the most important role in this process in their capacity as 
Ȑengineers of human souls.ȑ In the 1930s, a sense of threat to the gains of the 
revolution propelled Soviet policy makers to build institutions that fine-tuned the 
message of the press and verified the Ȑpolitical maturityȑ of those responsible for 
its contents. The Cold War reintroduced old existential anxieties about the security 
of the Soviet state and demanded extreme measures. By 1945 all the components 
of the campaign were in place: censorship, mobilised mass media, and the belief 
that journalists and writers could be dangerous weapons in the unfolding battle for 
Ȑhearts and minds.ȑ In the Soviet campaign against American correspondents, 
ideology operated overtly: the actors openly and self-consciously applied class 
analysis of mass media to foreign journalists. Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the 
press prompted Soviet ideologues to reject the American liberal model of news 
(and American journalistsȑ understanding of their own work), as false 
consciousness that aimed at concealing the bourgeois bias of Western press. 
Foreign correspondents were positioned in the narrative of class warfare and were 
seen as acting on behalf of the interests of the American bourgeoisie.  
 The American liberal ideal also stressed the educational role of mass media. 
However, the instructive potential of the American press sprang from a radically 
different premise. Soviet mass media fulfilled its educational role only in close 
collaboration with the state. By contrast, the educational capacity of the American 
press resided in its mandate to stand up to the powers that be and monitor their 
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actions. The principle of separation between the press and the government was 
central to the liberal ideology of American news media and to the campaign 
against TASS. The attacks on TASS had no coordinating structure and proceeded 
on several parallel fronts. In the process, punditsȑ and publishersȑ demands to 
take a hard line toward TASS often clashed with the agenda of government officials 
and their concern for American interests overseas. However, media professionals 
and the government agreed that TASSȑs relationship with the Soviet state 
rendered it illegitimate as a news service. Soviet correspondents were perceived as 
dangerous not because they were journalists, but because they were government-
controlled journalists, and therefore were expected to advance the interests of 
foreign power.  
 In the American campaign against TASS, ideology operated covertly. The 
participants in the campaign were not conscious of the ideological underpinnings 
of their actions. Convinced that the only way to report the news was the one 
practiced by the American liberal news media, they charged that Soviet-style 
reporting was not journalism at all. Although several leading voices in the 
journalistic profession did not support harsh measures against TASS, they shared 
the idea that it should not be considered a real news agency. The campaign against 
TASS thus naturalised the liberal ideology of news. At the same time, the campaign 
obscured the fissures in the journalistic profession and the disagreements between 
the press and the government over the rights and duties of the press vis-à-vis the 
national security state.  
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  Approaching the campaigns against enemy correspondents from a 
comparative perspective reveals that the attacks on journalists were not only 
symptoms of Cold War propaganda or the new information policies that each 
superpower adopted as a result of the growing suspicion of the other. Observers 
on both sides regarded enemy correspondents with suspicion because of the 
broader symbolic meaning that journalism had in Soviet socialist and American 
liberal ideology. In the Soviet Union, journalism symbolised the hope in 
propaganda as a vehicle of enlightenment, which would help the New Men and 
Women of the socialist society to develop their proletarian consciousness and 
transform themselves into historical actors and builders of socialism. In the United 
States, journalism represented the foundational principles of American democracy: 
the freedom to express oneȑs opinion, informed participation in the democratic 
process and the accountability of office holders to their electorate. These idealised 
notions of journalism remained unattainable in reality and were subjected to 
internal debates by practitioners who had their own prejudices. However, the ideal 
itself was never rejected on either side and lived on as a powerful symbol of Soviet 
socialist and American liberal capitalist modernity. As the respective campaigns 
against enemy correspondents unfolded, journalism became a symbol of the 
quintessential distinction between socialism and capitalism or liberalism and 
totalitarianism.   
  
 
